Whistleblower: ‘NM solar observatory hacked, Chinese may have gained control of sun weapon’

One of the original links:
http://www.shtfplan.com/headline-news/mysterious-security-issue-closes-sunspot-observatory-in-new-mexico_09172018

https://www.intellihub.com/whistleblower-nm-solar-observatory-hacked-chinese-may-have-gained-control-of-sun-weapon/


Whistleblower: ‘NM solar observatory hacked, Chinese may have gained control of sun weapon’

"Remember, their mission is the master control of the solar surface and the earth's meteorological configuration -- they need to control the weather -- they need to control the sun -- and they are oftly close."

By Intellihub.com -
 
September 14, 2018

In what can only be considered one of the most bizarre information leaks of 2018, an alleged DARPA whistleblower known only as ‘Sam’ appeared on Clyde Lewis’s Ground Zero radio show on Wednesday where he made the claim that Chinese bad actors are likely to blame for hacking the National Solar Observatory (NSO) in Sunspot, New Mexico, and may have been using or intended to use the facility as a solar weapon which is what prompted the FBI to take over the facility last Thursday along with a nearby post office and several homes.
Using a voice manipulation device Sam told Ground Zero host Clyde Lewis that he believes “the Sunspot solar facility has been hacked very probably by Chinese bad actors.”
“The reason they want to hack it is because the NSO in Sunspot is part of an intranet that also includes HAARP, HAMMER, and SMACC,” he explained. “Through this network we have been very successful at manipulation the solar surface and the coronasphere to the point that we can actually trigger coronial mass ejections of controlled size, duration, density, and intensity.”

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The whistleblower told Lewis “they are using scalar waves to trigger them” which are “transmitted through HAARP” at “unheard of” power levels.



Related:

Space Fence: Connecting the surveillance and transhumanist agendas

“Understand, HAARP is capable of transmitting signal strengths in excess of 50 gigawatts,” he said. “They require so much energy and the energy has to be such a high quality that it can only be provided by SMACC.”
“SMACC has its own nuclear reactors and you have to control the quality of electricity, the exact frequency with extremely accurate micro values all the while delivering unheard of voltage.”
“By hacking into the computers at the NSO they now have access to an intranet — the intranet connects the NSO, HAARP, HAMMER, and SMACC because they feed upon and require each other,” he explained. “You must have a network because there are so many thousands of gigabytes of information in constant flow to make this work… it’s delicate.”
“Remember, their mission is the master control of the solar surface and the earth’s meteorological configuration — they need to control the weather — they need to control the sun — and they are oftly close.”
HAARP stands for High-frequency Active Auroral Reseach Program.
HAMMER stands for High Altitude Meteorological Manipulation Energy Reseach.
SMACC stands for Scalar Magnetic Amplification Cognizant Configuration.

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/adversaries-could-have-fiddled-with-us-satellites-dodig/


Adversaries Could Have Fiddled With US Satellites: DoD IG
By COLIN CLARKon August 16, 2018 at 9:16 PM
 

WASHINGTON: If Chinese and Russian spies have been doing their jobs well, they might well have been able to compromise some of America’s most important satellites, including the missile launch detection birds known as SBIRS.
A report out today from the Pentagon’s Inspector General says that Air Force Space Command’s failure to safeguard its supply chain means that “an adversary has opportunity to infiltrate the Air Force Space Command supply chain and sabotage, maliciously introduce an unwanted function, or otherwise compromise the design or integrity of the critical hardware, software, and firmware.”
Of course, as Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and International Studiesnotes:

“This is really an audit report on whether AFSPC complied with the DoD supply chain risk management policy, and clearly there were issues.  It is important to note that just because proper policy and procedures were not followed does not necessarily mean that the system was actually compromised.”
But Harrison says that doesn’t let Space Command off the hook:

“That being said, we rely on these satellites to detect missile launches and queue our missile defense systems. SBIRS is among the most important military space systems we have, and the idea that these satellites are at higher risk of being compromised—or may have already been compromised—is disconcerting.  This is yet another black eye for the Air Force’s management of space acquisitions, and it will likely increase calls to transfer responsibility for programs like this to a new, independent service.”
Here’s what the IG found:

“Air Force Space Command did not take the steps and establish the controls and oversight necessary to:

• conduct a thorough criticality analysis and identify all critical components and associated suppliers to manage risks to the system throughout its lifecycle;
  
• submit complete and accurate requests to conduct threat assessments of critical component suppliers;
  
• require the purchase of all application-specific integrated circuits from trusted suppliers using trusted processes that are accredited; or
  
• ensure the use of rigorous test and evaluation capabilities, including developmental, acceptance, and operational testing
  

“In addition, our limited review of three other Air Force Space Command critical systems revealed concerns similar to those found with the Space Based Infrared System supply chain risk management.”

Congress is unlikely to be pleased and some will certainly use this finding to press harder with their colleagues to make a Space Force and Space Command a reality sooner rather than later.
“The current system is wasting billions of dollars and failing to deliver capability to the warfighter,” Reps. Mike Rogers and Jim Cooper, the top two lawmakers on the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee. said in a statement in August last year. “Our adversaries have already reorganized their space programs and are reaping the benefits. Those who continue to oppose reform need to explain to the warfighter, the American people, and their elected representatives how the status quo is acceptable.”
The vice commander of Air Force Space Command Space and Missile Systems (SMC) agreed with the IG’s recommendations on how to fix the problems found in the IG’s audit.
Here’s what SMC said it will do. Bear in mind this means they probably haven’t done it yet:

• “conduct a criticality analysis to accurately identify and compile a parts list for all critical components;
  
• “produce a critical components list that includes the break down for all logic-bearing devices to the component level and provide them with a request for information that includes all key information necessary to conduct threat assessments of critical item suppliers;
  
• “use the supplier threat assessment reports to determine the risk posture and identify potential mitigations for application specific integrated circuits not procured from a trusted supplier using trusted processes that are accredited; and
  
• “incorporate modernized requirements and verification processes to ensure the security of the program and perform verification and validation of these requirements using program protection surveys, independent third party assessors, and developmental and operational tests.”